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ABSTRACT  
In many countries, consumption of fruits and vegetables (F&V) is below recommended 
levels. We quantify the economic and health effects of a F&V stamp policy designed for low-
income consumers. The analysis combined two models: an economic model which predicts 
how F&V consumption is affected by a change in policy and a health model which evaluates 
the impact of a change in F&V consumption in terms of death avoided (DA) and life-years 
saved (LYS). We computed the costs per DA and LYS as the ratios between the taxpayer cost 
of the policy and the numbers of DA and LYS. 
The main findings are: at the aggregate level, a F&V stamp policy has a modest impact on 
consumption and as a result on health gains; however, when well designed, the F&V stamp 
policy may increase the F&V consumption of low-income households; to maximize the cost-
effectiveness of the F&V stamp policy, the targeted population must be rather small; the F&V 
stamp policy may be more cost-effective than a non-targeted policy based on a VAT decrease; 
a stamp policy may generate a small increase in the price of F&V thus reducing the 
consumption and the health benefits within the non targeted population.  
KEY WORDS: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, Fruits and Vegetables, Health Impact 
Assessment, Health Policy 
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Are Fruit and Vegetable Stamp Policies Cost-Effective? 
 
Introduction 
Poor nutritional outcomes in disfavoured and low-income households are crucial issues for 
health policy makers in many industrialized countries (Lock et al., 2005). Population groups 
with high poverty rates and low education levels are indeed often reported to face higher 
obesity and overweight prevalence, associated with lower-quality diets, higher intakes of 
energy-dense foods and smaller consumption of fruits and vegetables (F&V) (Blisard et al., 
2004; Disball et al., 2007; Fox and Cole, 2004; Frazao, 2007; Wilde at al., 1999). Even if 
other factors seem to play important roles (French et al., 2001; Cassady et al. 2007), economic 
factors are frequently considered as major determinants of food behaviours, low incomes 
binding the food diet choices and limiting the ability to have adequate food intakes according 
to dietary guidelines (Bihan et al., 2010; Drewnowski at al., 2004; Drewnowski and Specter, 
2004; Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005; Lin and Guthrie, 2007; Olson, 1999; Shenkin and 
Jacobson, 2010)).  
 
In the United States, food assistance programs have been implemented for a long time to help 
disfavoured populations from an economic point of view (Landers, 2007). Beside education 
programs, Food Stamp Program (FSP) aims to increase food expenditures by delivering to the 
households monthly stamps only useable to buy foods. In present days, 25 millions of people 
are involved in this program and receive an average amount of 200 dollars per household per 
year. FSP is generally considered to be successful in the sense that it provided food assistance 
to many low-income people, leading to a decrease in child poverty and food insecurity (Le 
Blanc et al., 2007; Pan and Jensen, 2008; Wilde and Nord, 2005). However the impacts on 
diet quality and nutrient needs are more controversial and the goals related to the reduction of 
obesity and overweight prevalence are not always met (Chen et al., 2005; Jones and Frongillo, 
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2006; Gibson, 2003 and 2006; Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk, 2008; Ver Ploeg et al., 2007: 
Wilde et al., 2000; Webb et al., 2008). It is worthwhile to note that the FSP allows 
participants to buy any foods they want and thus to consume the same diet as previously, even 
if it is dominated by energy-dense foods and beverages (Fox et al., 2004; Fox and Cole, 2004; 
Frongillo, 2003). For this reason, some authors proposed to re-design the FSP to allow only 
the purchase of healthy foods, especially F&V (Guthrie et al., 2007). Such a measure has been 
experimented within the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children and the Food Stamp (WIC), in which pregnant women in low-income households 
get a $10 voucher per week to purchase only fresh F&V. This experiment confirmed that 
providing F&V vouchers would increase purchase and consumption of a wide variety of 
nutrient dense fresh F&V among low income women and their families (Herman et al., 2008). 
 
In Europe, food stamp programs have not been implemented yet, as food assistance programs 
rely mainly on charity associations which distribute food surpluses. However the increase in 
health inequalities and in obesity prevalence among low income populations led some policy 
makers to propose to implement F&V stamp programs1. Some local experiments have been 
made in France to assess the impacts of €10 monthly vouchers per person. First results seem 
to attest some positive effects on F&V consumption (Bihan, 2008).  
 
However, redesigning the FSP in the US by limiting their use to F&V purchases, or 
generalizing the first European experiments to every low income households raises the 
question of the cost-effectiveness of this policy. Cost-effectiveness of F&V stamp policy 
depends on several factors. Firstly, it depends on the amount of money each participant gets to 
                                                            




buy F&V. This amount depends on the total budget allocated to the policy and on the size of 
the targeted population. Secondly, it depends on the initial consumption patterns of each 
participant. It is well-known that the behaviour of the household will depend on the value of 
the stamp compared to the initial expenditure (Alston et al. 2009). If the stamp is smaller than 
the budget initially devoted to F&V purchases, it acts as an increase in income and has the 
same effect on consumption as a cash transfer. If the stamp is greater, the value above the 
current F&V expenditure is fully devoted to F&V purchases. In the first case the impact is 
likely to be small while in the second it might be significant. Thirdly, the cost-effectiveness of 
the policy will depend on its aggregated effects on the participants and the non participants as 
well (Alston et al., 2009; Dallongeville et al., 2010). Indeed, if the program is successful it 
leads to an increase in the F&V demand. Then, it is likely that all the households will face 
higher prices which can limit the consumption increase among the participants to the program 
and favour a consumption decrease among the non participants. Finally, the cost-effectiveness 
of such a policy will depend on the health benefits linked to an increase of F&V consumption. 
 
Following Cash et al. (2005) and Dallongeville et al. (2010), the goal of the paper is to assess 
the effects of the various dimensions mentioned above (budget allocated to the F&V program, 
size of the targeted population, initial consumption and expenditures of the targeted 
population) on the economic and health impacts of a F&V stamp policy. An economic model 
of the F&V market is used to provide the impacts of the food stamp policy on F&V 
consumption. Then a health model is used to assess the impact of the changes in F&V 
consumption levels on the number of deaths avoided (DA) and life-years saved (LYS) from 
non communicable diseases. This economic/health model is used to simulate a F&V stamp 
policy and determine the modifications of F&V consumption among participants and non 
participants to the F&V stamp program, depending on the budget allocated and the size of the 
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targeted population. According to the health consequences assessed by simulation, we then 
compute the costs per DA and LYS induced by this policy. The simulations are made using 
French data.  
 
Our results contribute to a larger debate in public health dealing with the compared benefits of 
targeted versus population-based prevention strategies. Introduced by Rose (1992), an 
argument in favour of non targeted strategies is that more disease can be often prevented by 
reducing a risk factor by a small amount in the total population than by selectively reducing it 
by a large amount in high-risks individuals. Considering risk factors such as cholesterol, Rose 
(2001) showed that a strategy that reduced the population average of cholesterol would lower 
the prevalence of clinical heart disease more than a strategy focused on people with the 
highest cholesterol values. This result has been discussed by several authors in relation to 
medical issues like risk prediction methods (Zulman et al., 2008) or to the costs of the 
interventions (Ahern et al., 2008). In this paper we continue this discussion by considering the 
potential effects of markets mechanisms on the trade-off between targeted / non targeted 
strategies. More precisely, we compare the targeted F&V stamp policy to the impacts induced 
by a non targeted policy based on reduction of F&V price thanks to a VAT decrease. Previous 
works showed that F&V stamp policy seemed to be able to reduce health inequalities but its 
cost-effectiveness appeared to be smaller than non-targeted policies relying on F&V price 
reduction or generic information campaigns (Dallongeville et al., 2010). We argue here that 
targeting the F&V stamp policy is an important issue which can significantly affect its cost-
effectiveness. The health/economic model is used to determine to what extent, depending on 
the size of the targeted population, such a targeted F&V stamp prevention strategy is better 




We present the general economic model in section 1, and the health model in section 2. In 
section 3 we explain how these models are applied to simulate F&V stamp policies and assess 
their cost-effectiveness. The main results are presented in section 4. The limits of our results 
and their policy implications are discussed in section 5. 
 
 
1. The economic model 
Equilibrium Displacement Models have been developed to analyze market impacts of various 
policies such as country of origin labeling (Lusk and Anderson, 2004), R&D expenses 
(Wolghenant, 1993), or price floor mechanisms (Bouamra-Mechemache and Réquillart, 
2000). In this paper we propose such a model in order to determine to what extent the current 
consumption of F&V as the result of the market equilibrium between the F&V supply and 
demand functions, could be modified by any change in policy variables, such as consumers’ 
income or VAT rate. 
In the following, we distinguish two segments in the population: the targeted population 
which benefits from the food-stamp policy and the non-targeted one. Within each population, 
we define Nj (with j=1 for the targeted population and j=2 for the non-targeted population) 
groups of consumers according to their consumption of F&V. Without loss of generality, in 
population 1, groups are ordered according to an increasing level of consumption. Formally, 
the market equilibrium is defined by the following equations: 
∑ ∑ ,    (1) 
∑ ∑ ,    (2) 
     (3) 
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      (4) 
      (5) 
1       (6) 
with  the total quantity demanded,  and  the quantities demanded by group j of 
consumers in populations 1 and 2 respectively,  and  the number of groups of consumers 
in populations 1 and 2,  and  the quantities demanded by populations 1 and 2,  the 
consumer price,  and  the income of populations 1 and 2,  the quantity supplied,   the 
producer price, and  the tax coefficient. In this setting, prices and quantities are the 
endogenous variables while the other ones (income, tax coefficient) are exogenous.  
Equations (1) and (2) define the demand function for the two populations. It is the sum of 
demand functions from each group of consumers. These demands depend on consumer price 
and income. Obviously demand depends on other elements (such as information for example) 
which are integrated here in the g function which is a characteristic of the group. We assume 
that the good consumed is homogenous; then both populations are facing the same consumer 
price. Moreover, we consider that the income is population specific but not group specific. 
Equation (3) states that the total quantity demanded is the sum of the demand from 
populations 1 and 2. Equation (4) states that the supply depends on producer price.2 Equation 
(5) states that at equilibrium the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied. Finally 
equation (6) defines the relation between the consumer price and the producer price.  
                                                            
2 Obviously supply depends on other elements but they will play no role here as they are considered to be 
exogenous and not affected by the policy variables. We can thus neglect them.  
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Totally differentiating the set of equations (1) to (6) leads to the following system which 
relates the relative change of endogenous variables to the relative change of exogenous 
variables:  
1 0 0 0 0 ε
0 1 0 0 0 ε
α α 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 η 0
0 0 1 1 0 0












τE 1 τ τ⁄
 (7) 
denoting EX the ratio dX/X with X representing any variable; and with  the own-
price elasticity of supply, ∑ ∑ ,  the own-price elasticity of 
demand of population i ( and ,  are the share of consumption and the own-price elasticity 
of demand of group j in population i, respectively), ∑ ∑ ,  the 
income elasticity of demand of population i ( ,  is the income elasticity of demand of group j 
in population i), and α Q
Q Q
 the share of demand from population 1. The own-price and 
income elasticities of demand of population i are a weighted average of the respective 
elasticities over the groups in population i. In the standard case, we have  
η 0; ε 0; ε 0;  εY 0;  εY 0.  
To analyze the impact of a change in exogenous variables on endogenous variables, the 
system of equations (7) is solved given the value of the change in exogenous variables. For 
example, a relative increase in income by  leads to an exogenous shift of demand (in %) 
from population 1 by . Then this exogenous shift in demand generates a change in 
consumption taking into account price adjustments that are evaluated by solving the model.  
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1.1 Impact of a change in the tax rate 
By decreasing the tax rate the public authority favors F&V consumption. To infer the impact 
of this policy, we solved the system (7) with 0, while the other exogenous variables are 
kept constant ( 0). We get: 
;      (8) 
    (9) 
      (10) 
     (11) 
with 1  > 0 in the standard case. Then, a decrease in the rate of 
taxation ( 0) leads to a higher consumption, to a lower consumer price and to a higher 
producer price. It is easy to show that for a given decrease in the rate of taxation, the increase 
in consumption is higher when the demand is more elastic or the supply is more elastic.  
1.2 Impact of a F&V stamp policy 
F&V stamp policy must be analyzed by considering that F&V stamps act through two 
channels. Assume first that the value of the F&V stamp (denoted S) given to a consumer j is 
lower than her current expenditure in F&V (denoted ). In this case, the F&V stamp is 
equivalent to a change in income: this is the first channel. To get the intuition, assume that 
 and that the consumer does not change her habits. This consumer uses the F&V 
stamp to purchase part of her consumption of F&V. By doing so, the consumer saves money 
which can be used for any other use. Then, the F&V stamp is equivalent to a change in 
income (see Alston et al. (2009) for a discussion). However, if the value of the F&V stamp is 
larger to the current expenditure, there is a second channel. The consumer is somewhat forced 
to buy a larger quantity of F&V. The corresponding relative increase in consumption is equal 
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to . Thus when the value of the F&V is larger than current expenditure, the 
impact comes from the two channels: the ‘income’ channel for a value equal to the current 
expenditure and the second one for the remaining part. In term of modeling, first row of (7) 
only takes into account the first channel, implicitly assuming ‘small’ value F&V stamps. To 
generalize to any value of F&V stamp, we need to take into account the second channel. 
To formalize this, let first define  such that: 
1, … ,   and 1, … ,  .3  
Depending on the group, the F&V stamp acts through both channels or through only the 
income channel. The exogenous change of demand (in %) due to the F&V stamp policy is 
given by:  
,  1, … ,   
, ⁄  1, … ,  , 
with  representing the (exogenous) percentage variation of demand from consumer j. 










EQ ε EP ∑N , Min , ∑N Max 0,    (12) 
                                                            
3 If  , then  and if , then 1. 
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The right hand side of (12) is the sum of two terms. The first one corresponds to the 
exogenous change in demand due to the income effect (channel 1) and the second one to the 
exogenous change in demand due to the ‘forced’ increase in consumption. Both terms are a 
weighted sum of the impact on each group. These two terms thus represents the exogenous 
change in demand due to the F&V stamps given to population 1. We denote ED1 the sum of 
these two terms, writing (12) as EQ ε EP ED  which is the new form of the first row 
in (7) with ED ∑N , Min , ∑N 0, . 
The system (7) is now solved with 0, 0 and 0, we get:  
1    13  
   14  
  (15) 
   (16) 
Note that (13) to (16) are an approximation of the real effect as by writing (13) to (16) we 
neglect the changes of the consumer price in the value of ED1.4 Equation (13) provides the 
relative change of consumption in population 1. It is the sum of the relative increase in 
consumption at constant price ( ) and the relative decrease in consumption (  due 
to the price increase (Equation (16)). The final relative increase of consumption by population 
1 is positive as the indirect and negative price effect is lower than the direct and positive 
                                                            
4 The computed price effect is small (lower than 1% in any case) thus justifying this approximation and the way 
we deal with.  
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effect of F&V stamps. The quantity consumed by population 2 always decreases ( 0) 
as population 2 only faces the price increase.  
 
2. The health model 
Owing to the well-documented association between F&V consumption and cancer or 
cardiovascular diseases, we focused the analysis only on these major causes of death. Table 1 
gives the relative risks (RRs) of specific causes of death associated with an increase by one 
serving of F&V, i.e. the decrease in the probability of each disease induced by an additional 
consumption of 80g/day. These data were taken from recently published meta-analyses for 
cancer deaths and for cardiovascular deaths (coronary and stroke) (Dauchet et al., 2005; 
Dauchet et al., 2006). To assess the number of deaths by cancer and cardiovascular disease 
avoided by changes in F&V intake, we hypothesized a log linear dose effect relationship 
using the following formula: (1-RRΔF&V) * number of deaths, where RR is the relative risk for 
an additional serving per day and ΔF&V is the change in F&V intake (in servings of 80g per 
day). The number of LYS was estimated by multiplying the number of DA by the mean 
expected number of years of life lost for each disease. To evaluate the latter, we used recent 
mortality and cause specific mortality data for France in 2006 (additional details in 
Dallongeville et al., 2010). We estimated the life expectancy at each age using French 
mortality data on total deaths. Then an expected number of years of life lost for each cause of 
death was calculated according to distributions of causes of death by age (Murray, 1994). 
To account for the effect of social disparities on disease rates we used the relative inequality 
index (RII) associated with occupational status in France (Saurel-Cubizolles et al., 2009), thus 
estimating cancer and cardiovascular death rates in the lowest deciles of income distribution 
of the French population. Owing to the lack of specific RII values for each cancer type and for 
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stroke or coronary heart diseases, we used the following values: 4.53 [3.94-5.21] and 2.09 
[1.71-2.56] for cancers and 4.50 [3.65-5.54] and 5.84 [3.94-8.65] for cardiovascular diseases, 
in men and women respectively. Numbers in brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 1. Estimated relative risks (RR) of death for one additional portion of F&V, number of 
deaths and expected number of years of life lost per each cause of death. 
 
Table 1 clearly shows that, in proportion of the population, the number of deaths related to 
cancer and cardiovascular diseases among poor people (here the first decile of income) are 
much higher than in the population considered as a whole. 





of income Men Women
Cancer
Mouth, pharynx and larynx 0.92 [0.81 - 1.06]   5,536 1,013 18.5 20.4
Esophagus 0.92 [0.85 - 1.00]   3,837  696 16.1 15.8
Stomach 0.97 [0.93 - 1.01]   4,763  820 13.7 13.7
Pancreas 0.97 [0.90 - 1.04]   8,263 1,369 14.5 13.9
Lung 0.94 [0.92 - 0.97]  28,347 5,088 16.0 20.0
Colon and rectum 0.99 [0.94 - 1.04]  16,426 2,733 12.4 12.6
Ovary 0.84 [0.62 - 1.13]   3,342  463 17.1
Cardiovascular disease
Coronary heart disease 0.97 [0.94 - 0.99]  38,806 7,497 11.6 8.4
Stroke 0.96 [0.94 - 0.98]  32,652 6,335 10.2 8.8
Disease 
RR for one aditional 
serving of fruits and 
vegetables:
Mean [CI 95%]
Number of deaths Expected number ofyears of life lost per death
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Using data from the INCA 2 survey (http://www.afssa.fr/index.htm) which provides (among 
others) the F&V consumption as well as income, we distinguished low income consumers 
(LIC) who belong to the first decile of income from standard income consumers (SIC). The 
first decile of income is approximately composed of people who live under the poverty 
threshold. Those two segments of consumers differ by the distribution of F&V consumption 
with LIC consuming less than SIC (see Table 2).  
Daily Consumption Proportion of consumers (%) 




< 100 g/day 18 8 
< 200 g/day 38 24 
< 300 g/day 55 41 
< 400 g/day 68 57 
< 500 g/day 82 72 
< 600 g/day 90 83 
 Consumption (g/day) 
Mean 315 390 
Median  262 355 
 
Table 2: Distribution of F&L consumption in the two sub-populations 
 
We evaluate the F&V stamp policy for different rates of targeting, the targeted population 
(that is population 1 in the theoretical model) being a part of LIC if the rate of targeting is 
lower than 10%, or all the LIC if the rate of targeting is 10%. This means that in the empirical 
model, population 2 is the combination of non-targeted LIC (if any) and SIC (who are always 
non-targeted). Then, targeted consumers are characterized by the distribution of consumption 
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of LIC while non targeted consumers have a distribution of consumption which is the 
aggregation of distribution of consumption from non targeted LIC and from SIC.  
 
We use average value of income for each population. That is LIC has an average income of 
7472 €/year (INSEE 20065) and SIC 21885 €/year. When targeting only a part of LIC, we also 
use the average income of the targeted population according to INSEE data. 
The extent of the consumers’ or producers’ responses to any policy depends on the value of 
the economic parameters of the model especially the price, income and supply elasticities. 
Price and income elasticities of demand were mainly defined on the basis of the French 
studies mentioned in Table 3. It appears that the price elasticity of demand of the whole 
population for different categories of F&V ranges between -0.24 and -1.15. Price elasticity of 
demand from low income population ranges between a low price elasticity of -0.06 to a high 
elasticity of -1.27. These results do not provide strong evidence of a significant difference of 
behavior between LIC and SIC. Then we calculated the average and standard deviation from 
these studies (-0.85 and 0.3 respectively) and used these values to characterized the price 
elasticity of demand of both populations. 
With respect to supply elasticity, we did not find any study referring specifically to France. 
However, contrary to the F&V demand which is likely to be country-specific, the producers’ 
flexibility of supply is more similar from one country to another. For this reason, we 
considered that it was admissible to use values obtained in non French studies. For instance, 
Alston et al. (2009) in a study on food stamps in the US, use a supply elasticity of 1.0 arguing 
that it reflects medium run response. Jetter et al. (2004) analyze the impact of ‘5 a day’ 





and perennial crops: 0.5, 1.0 and 0.75 (respectively) for low values and 1.0, 1.5 and 1.25 
(respectively) for high values. In this study, we thus chose a value of 1 for the price elasticity 
of supply with a standard deviation of 0.25. 
 
(* elasticities for non poor people rather than for the whole population) 
Table 3: Price and income elasticities in France 
 
The parameters of the model (3 economic and 13 health parameters) were supposed to follow 
independent lognormal distributions. Monte-Carlo simulations were performed by drawing 10 
million times a 16-uplet of parameters. For each uplet, we computed the changes induced by 
each policy scenario for the following variables: F&V consumption for each category of 
 
    Price elasticity Price elasticity Income Elasticity 










-0,7   
    





  0,89 
    
Vegetables   0,3 












-0,79 -1,15 0,37 
Processed 
Vegetables 
-1,02 -1,03 0,27 












-0,58* -0,61  
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consumers, number of statistical DA, number of statistical LYS, cost per statistical DA, cost 
per statistical LYS. We then calculate the median and the 2.5 and 97.5 centiles for each 
variable. Finally we determine whether the policies reduce or not the health disparities within 
the population computing an odds-ratio defined as:  
%   LIC  / %   LIC  
%   SIC  / %   SIC 
  
 
To facilitate the comparison between price policy and F&V stamp policy, we ran simulations 
for a given ex ante budget allocated to the policy. We choose 300 M€. Targeting 5% of the 
population with this budget allows for a monthly €10 stamp. This amount is the same than the 
stamp amount given to poor individuals in the experiment implemented in France (Bihan, 
2008). The VAT reduction allowed with such a budget is 3.06%, which is close to the 
maximum potential reduction of VAT (current VAT is 5.5% and the lowest rate is 2.1%, that 
is 3.4% reduction).  
 
4. Results 
Impact of the price policy 
The decrease in VAT generates a decrease in consumer price by 1.2% which in turn leads to 
an average increase in consumption of 3.7 g/day. The increase in consumption by SIC 
consumers is slightly larger than the one of LIC consumers as they have a higher initial 
consumption. The median number of DA and LYS for the whole population is 279 and 3851 
respectively. The mean cost per LYS is 78 k€ [45 – 146]. 6 
 
                                                            
6 2.5 and 97.5 centiles are given in brackets. 
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Impact of the F&V stamp policy  
For a given amount of financing, the impact of F&V stamp policy decreases with the rate of 
targeting.7 Thus, for a 300 M€ budget, the median increase in consumption for the whole 
population is 0.4 g/day when targeting is 10%, 0.8 g/day when it is 5%, 1.9 g/day when it is 
2% (Table 4). Targeted population increases significantly her consumption while non-targeted 
population (whatever they are LIC or SIC) decreases her consumption due to the price effect. 
For example, when targeting 2% of the population the median increase in consumption for 
targeted consumers is 168.6 g/day while the median consumption for non-targeted LIC and 
SIC consumers decreases by 1.3 and 1.6 g/day, respectively. In this example, the increase in 
demand from targeted consumers generates a slight increase in the consumer price (0.5%) 
leading to a decrease in the consumption of non-targeted consumers. The change in 
consumption of targeted consumers crucially depends on the rate of targeting. For example, it 
is 6.2g/day when targeting 10% of the population, 27.0 g/day when targeting 5% and 
168.6g/day when targeting 2% of the population respectively.  
                                                            




Table 4. Policy comparison: simulation Results (Total budget=300 M€) for LIC and SIC (Low and Standard Income Consumers) 
Median 2.5%ile 97.5%ile Median 2.5%ile 97.5%ile Median 2.5%ile 97.5%ile Median 2.5%ile 97.5%ile
Value of the F&V stamp (€/year for each targeted person) 63               126             314            
Consumer price variation (%) ‐ 1.23         ‐ 1.65         ‐ 0.78         0.09            0.06            0.15            0.20            0.13            0.31            0.49            0.33            0.74           
Individual consumption variation (g/day)
Targeted LIC 3.1              2.0              4.7              6.2              5.6              8.4              27.0            25.6            32.4            168.6         164.8         182.8        
Non‐targted LIC 3.1              2.0              4.7              ‐ 0.5           ‐ 0.8           ‐ 0.3           ‐ 1.3           ‐ 1.9           ‐ 0.8          
Non‐targeted SIC 3.8              2.4              5.7              ‐ 0.3           ‐ 0.5           ‐ 0.2           ‐ 0.6           ‐ 1.0           ‐ 0.4           ‐ 1.6           ‐ 2.3           ‐ 0.9          
Whole population 3.7              2.4              5.6              0.4              0.2              0.5              0.8              0.5              1.1              1.9              1.2              2.5             
Number of death avoided (DA)
Targeted LIC 9                  5                  16               89               57               133             202             133             281             486             321             650            
Non‐targted LIC 34               19               57               ‐ 3               ‐ 6               ‐ 2               ‐ 14             ‐ 23             ‐ 7              
Non‐targeted SIC 235             128             401             ‐ 19             ‐ 33             ‐ 9               ‐ 40             ‐ 68             ‐ 20             ‐ 98             ‐ 164          ‐ 50            
Whole population 279             152             474             70               44               106             157             101             225             370             240             512            
Cancer 165             75               301             38               19               62               84               44               130             190             97               285            
Cardio‐Vascular 112             52               204             32               16               53               73               37               116             180             93               276            
Number of of life‐years saved (LYS)
Targeted LIC 126             69               214             1198           759             1796           2718           1752           3794           6470           4216           8636          
Non‐targted LIC 456             249             777             ‐ 47             ‐ 80             ‐ 24             ‐ 190          ‐ 317          ‐ 98            
Non‐targeted SIC 3268           1741           5619           ‐ 260          ‐ 463          ‐ 129          ‐ 555          ‐ 952          ‐ 278          ‐ 1359        ‐ 2296        ‐ 685         
Whole population 3851           2062           6607           930             581             1426           2093           1332           3003           4855           3115           6708          
Cancer 2738           1269           4968           620             326             1011           1381           736             2127           3109           1639           4610          
Cardio‐Vascular 1099           501             2006           310             154             515             711             356             1124           1748           888             2677          
Mean cost per DA (M€) 1.08            0.63            1.97            4.31            2.82            6.81            1.91            1.33            2.96            0.81            0.59            1.25           
Mean cost per LYS (k€) 78               45               146             323             210             517             143             100             225             62               45               96              








Figure 1 provides the initial and final distribution of F&V consumption of LIC distinguishing 
between targeted consumers and non targeted consumers.8 Among the targeted population, the 
increase in consumption mainly concerns those who have a ‘small’ initial level of 
consumption, that is consumers for which the value of the food stamp was higher than their 
initial consumption of F&V. All those consumers, when implementing the policy, consume 
(almost) the same quantity which is the value of the stamp divided by the price of F&V.9  
 
Figure 1. Initial and Final F&V consumption of LIC (Low Income Consumers) when F&V 
stamps are provided to 2% of the population (Total budget=300 M€) 
                                                            
8 Results for non-targeted SIC are similar to the one presented for non-targeted LIC. That is basically a slight 
decrease in consumption. 
9 It is slightly increasing with the initial consumption, as a part of the F&V stamp equal to the initial expenditure 
of each consumer acts as an increase in income which is partly used for purchasing F&V. As initial expenditure 
depends on consumer, we get a slightly increasing curve. 













































Targeted LIC's new consumption




Consumers with an initial level of expenditure larger than the value of the F&V stamp slightly 
increase their consumption. Non targeted consumers decrease only slightly their consumption 
as they face a price increase. The larger the initial consumption is, the larger the magnitude of 
this effect. 
In line with the change in consumption, the numbers of DA and LYS increase when the rate 
of targeting decreases (Table 4). When targeting 10% of the population, the median numbers 
of DA and LYS are respectively 70 [44-106] and 930 [581-1426], while targeting 2% of the 
population leads to median numbers of DA and LYS which are respectively 370 [240-512] 
and 4855 [3115-6708]. As a consequence the health disparities between SIC and LIC 
populations decrease when the size of the targeted population decreases: the health benefits 
obtained by the targeted LIC population are greater than the price related deleterious health 
effects on the non targeted LIC and SIC population (see the odds-ratio variation in Table 4).  
Similarly, the cost per statistical LYS decreases when the rate of targeting decreases. It is 
323k€ [210 - 517] when targeting 10% of the population, 143 k€ [100 - 225] when targeting 
5%, and 62 k€ [45 - 96] when targeting 2%.  
Thus, targeting a lower fringe of the population decreases the cost per LYS (or DA) of the 
policy. However, there is a limit. When targeting on fewer people (lower than 1% of the 
population in our example), the cost per LYS strongly increases (Figure 2a). This is because 
the number of LYS in the targeted population is now small due to the size of the population. 
The negative impact in the non targeted population might be larger than the positive impact in 
the targeted population. With a 300 M€ budget devoted to the policy, the optimal targeting is 




Figure 2a. Cost by LYS according to the size of targeted population  
(Total budget=300 M€) 
 
When targeting is large (Figure 2b), the cost per LYS is high but varies at a lower rate with 
targeting. In this zone, the value of the F&V stamp is lower than the lowest value (among 
consumers) of the initial F&V expenditure. In other words, the F&V stamp acts only through 
a change in income (the second channel identified in the model section) and not through a 
direct increase in consumption (the first channel identified in the model section).  




































Figure 2b. Cost by LYS according to the size of targeted population  
(Total budget=20, 40, 60, 80, 300 M€) 
 
Optimal targeting  
Figure 3a provides iso-LYS curves when both the targeting and the total amount of funding 
vary. For a given funding, the number of LYS increases when the size of the targeted 
population decreases (e.g., for 250 M€, 1000 LYS are obtained when targeting the poorest 
7%, 3000 LYS for 2.5%, and 5000 LYS for 1%). Besides, higher resources devoted to the 
policy allow increasing the rate of targeting or the number of LYS (e.g. going from 225 M€ 
targeted on the 2% poorest to 300 M€ can be done at iso-LYS 3000 by targeting the 3.5% 
poorest, or at iso-target 2% resulting in 5000 LYS). Finally, iso-LYS curves are increasing 
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with the size of the targeted population. This means that the most cost effective policy for a 
given number of LYS is reached at the left end of each curve (e.g. around 240M€ for the 0.8% 
poorest to obtain 5000 LYS). The most cost-effective budget-target policies are also 
represented on Figure 3a (see dotted lines). 
 
Figure 3a. Iso-LYS (Life Years Saved) curves and lowest costs by LYS curves, according to 
the size of the targeted population and the total budget allocated to the F&V stamps 
 
Similarly, Figure 3b presents iso-cost by LYS curves. It shows that, for instance, the cost-
effectiveness level of 80 k€/LYS can be reached by targeting 1% of the population with 


































1000 LYS at median
1000 LYS at 2.5 or 97.5 centiles
3000 LYS at median
3000 LYS at 2.5 or 97.5 centiles
5000 LYS at median
5000 LYS at 2.5 or 97.5 centiles
Lowest costs/LYS at median
Lowest costs/LYS at 2.5 or 97.5 centiles
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100 M€ and 4% of the population with 450 M€. Contrarily to Figure 3a, in Figure 3b, all left 
ends are at (0,0): nobody targeted (and thus no budget allocated). Hence, all costs by LYS are 
possible either for a given target or for a given budget, as long as they are chosen above a 
minimum threshold (around 50 k€ for the median, 40 k€ for the 2.5 centile and 75 k€ for the 
97.5 centile, as shown on Figure 2a). 
 
 
Figure 3b. Iso-cost by LYS (Life Year Saved) curves according to the size of the targeted 
population and the total budget allocated to the F&V stamps 
 

































  80 k€ by LYS at median
 80 k€ by LYS at 2.5 or 97.5 centiles
200 k€ by LYS at median
200 k€ by LYS at 2.5 or 97.5 centiles
320 k€ by LYS at median




The analysis presented in this paper, based on collaboration between economists and 
epidemiologists combined two models: an economic model which predicts how F&V 
consumption is affected by a change in policy and a health model which evaluates the impact 
of a change in F&V consumption in terms of DA and LYS. Finally we computed the costs per 
DA and LYS as the ratios between the taxpayer cost of the policy and the numbers of DA and 
LYS.  
The interest of this approach is to propose ex ante analysis of the cost-effectiveness of policies 
whereas the large majority of works analyzing cost-effectiveness of health policies are based 
on ex post evaluation of policies or on ex post evaluation of experiments. Such an approach 
has been used previously for analyzing the possible effects of consumption subsidies for 
healthier foods (Cash et al., 2005) and for assessing the impacts of alcohol pricing policies 
and modelling the effect of consumption changes on mortality and disease prevalence 
(Purshouse et al., 2010). 
The main findings of the present study are: (1) at the aggregate level, a F&V stamp policy has 
a modest impact on consumption and as a result on health gains; (2) when well designed, the 
F&V stamp policy may significantly increase the F&V consumption of low-income 
households; (3) for a given budget allocated to the policy, the benefit of the policy increases 
and the cost per DA or LYS decreases when the number of beneficiaries decreases; (4) to 
maximize the cost-effectiveness of the F&V stamp policy, the targeted population must be 
rather small; (5) when well designed, the F&V stamp policy (targeted policy) is more cost-
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effective than a VAT decrease10 (non targeted policy); (6) a stamp policy might generate an 
increase in the price of F&V thus reducing the consumption and the health benefits within the 
non targeted population.  
Despite the large shifts in F&V intake in the targeted population, the total life gains appear to 
be quite modest. Indeed the expected benefits of F&V consumption, estimated from most 
recent meta-analyses, are moderate compared to earlier estimations based on case-control 
studies. Moreover although the burden of cancer and cardiovascular diseases represents more 
than 2/3 of total deaths in France, the favorable association with F&V consumption is 
documented for only about half of their etiologies (1/3 of total deaths). This means that the 
overall impact of increasing F&V intake on total mortality is calculated on this third of total 
deaths.  
As mentioned in the paper, the F&V stamp acts through two channels. The most effective 
channel requires providing to the targeted consumers a stamp whose value is larger than their 
initial F&V expenditure. For a given total amount allocated to the F&V stamp program, this 
happens only when a ‘small’ number of consumers are selected. The other channel is less 
effective as the F&V stamp is equivalent to an increase in income and can therefore be used 
for any purpose. Thus the cost effectiveness of the policy increases when targeting a smaller 
share of the LIC population. 
In a recent paper Alston et al. (2008) put forward the fact that the induced changes in prices 
related to food stamps limited to healthy food consumption could result in decreases in 
consumption of healthy foods by non-targeted households. In our analysis, we identify such a 
non intentional effect: the policy increases the consumption of a small share of the population 
                                                            
10 For a 300 M€ budget, the F&V stamp policy is more cost-effective than the VAT reduction policy if the 




while it slightly decreases the consumption of F&V of a large share of the population. 
According to our simulations, this non intentional effect reduces by 20 to 25% (depending on 
the targeting rate) the number of DA induced by the policy. It is important to understand that 
this non intentional effect is due to the increase in the price of F&V. This increase in price 
depends on the additional demand generated by the policy but also on the supply response. In 
the short term, elasticities of supply are rather small, thus amplifying this issue. In the long 
run, elasticities of supply tend to be high thus limiting the price increase. For instance, 
simulations made with supply elasticity equal to 3, show that the deleterious impact of the 
policy on non targeted population is smaller: in this case, when targeting 2% of the 
population, the non intentional effect only reduces by around 10% the number of DA induced 
by the policy. 
 
Clearly, our results must be considered in relation with some limitations that open up the 
scope for further research. On the health model side, we limited our analysis to the assessment 
of DA and LYS. It is likely that considering only these criteria led us to underestimate the 
health benefits related to F&V consumption. It would be useful to widen the analysis by 
taking into account the possible effects of the policies on the health care costs and the 
morbidity levels. By doing so, it would possible to evaluate the variations of Quality Adjusted 
of Life Year Saved (QALYS) induced by the studied policies.  
 
On the economic model side, we focused on a product category rather than considering a 
system of demand for food. Thus we ignored the substitutions that might occur with other 
foods which might have health impacts. On the other way, considering the F&V sector as a 
single product category prevented us from taking into account the heterogeneity of price 
sensitivity according to the type of products within this sector. Elsewhere we considered that 
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whatever their income consumers buy the same good at the same mean price and we ignored 
the possibility of quality differences. It is not necessarily the case and it is likely that the mean 
price of purchased F&V depends on the consumers’ category. Moreover we assumed that an 
income increase led to an increase in the quantity of F&V bought by the households rather 
than to an increase in their quality (possibly with no increase in the quantity). Technically it is 
possible to deal with these issues. However, it would be necessary to get more information 
about the heterogeneity of price sensitivity of consumers according to the type of products 
within the F&V category and the quality choice by consumers when their incomes change.  
Another limit is related to the modeling of stamps. We have assumed that consumers do not 
resell the stamps and do ‘eat’ the additional quantities of F&V they buy, that they consider 
stamps as an increase in income (as long as the value of the stamp is not too high) and that the 
stamps do not convey any information. These are three strong assumptions.  
Indeed, due to the first assumption, we over-estimate the impact of stamps. Thus reselling 
stamps (or selling the products one buys with the stamps) is equivalent to an increase of the 
size of the targeted population. We have seen that a larger targeting leads to a lower cost-
effectiveness. The reasons for which consumers might want to sell the stamps or the products 
are numerous. Among others, it is well known that modifying his/her diet is difficult and that 
it is not only budget constraints that fully explains a low consumption in F&V. Contrary to 
the second assumption, it is possible that some consumers consider that they have to buy 
some F&V with the stamps in addition to what they already buy. Social norms for instance 
could explain such practices and lead to larger effects than those assessed in our analysis. 
Finally, the third assumption led us to under-estimate the impact of food stamps by ignoring 
the fact that the stamp can convey some information and contribute to nutritional education 
that might change the consumers’ demand.  
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Despite these limitations, the approach proposed in this paper contributes to open an 
interesting field of research and gives some results that are important to consider before 
implementing a public health policy related to food consumption. Indeed, we show that, in 
this case, the trade-off between targeted versus population-based policies is influenced by 
factors which determine the market equilibriums (price, income and supply, size of the 
targeted population…). Contrary to previous research in public health, we show that 
population-based strategies are not necessarily more cost-effective than targeted strategies 
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